CVE-2026-63964

Popis

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: ucsi: ccg: reject firmware images without a -:- record header do_flash() locates the first .cyacd record with p = strnchr(fw->data, fw->size, -:-); while (p < eof) { s = strnchr(p + 1, eof - p - 1, -:-); ... } If the firmware image contains no -:- byte, strnchr() returns NULL. NULL compares less than the valid kernel pointer eof, so the loop body runs and strnchr() is called with p + 1 == (void *)1 and a length of roughly (unsigned long)eof, causing a wonderful crash. The not_signed_fw fallthrough earlier in do_flash() and the chip-state branches in ccg_fw_update_needed() allow an unsigned blob to reach this loop, so a root user who can place a crafted file under /lib/firmware and write the do_flash sysfs attribute can trigger the oops. Bail out with -EINVAL when the initial strnchr() returns NULL.